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court seems to have adopted the analogy between governmental and
private entities as a basis for imposing liability, a basis which, as stated
above, is an improper rationale due to the inherent difference between
public and private entities.
Moreover, the same policy that would protect government corporations from
the payment of damages for the injuries they bring upon others would be
equally pertinent to a like immunity to protect private corporations, for con-
ceivably many essential private concerns could also be put out of business by
the damages they could incur under tort liability. But as a matter of fact, this
argument has no practical basis. Private concerns have rarely been greatly
embarrassed, and in no instance, even where immunity is not recognized, has
a municipality been seriously handicapped by tort liability.8 3
With the obvious dichotomy between the General Assembly and the
courts in Illinois, coupled with the high degree of sovereign responsibility
which the state has assumed under the present Court of Claims system,
no useful purpose can be seen in either changing or modifying Article
IV, section 26 of the Illinois Constitution. Also, in view of the position
taken by the Supreme Court of Illinois, it would seem that the retention
of this provision is necessary for the preservation of the legislative right
to set public policy in an area where it is uniquely able to so act.
Henry Novoselsky
PROPOSED REMEDY FOR THE INADEQUACIES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SETTLEMENTS
By revising the state constitution, the people of Illinois could take the
opportunity to deal with the irritating problem of sovereign immunity,
and in particular, with article IV section 26 of the state constitution. As
was previously indicated, the courts, until very recently, have adhered
slavishly to this constitutional mandate, perhaps only because a sufficient
alternate administrative procedure was available, but this certainly does
not mean there should not be modification. As one writer has put it:
even though we should not search for a binding past purpose, we may look for
past evils, changes, developments and trends-all as aids in understanding the
present. As Lincoln said "if we could first know where we are, and whither
we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it." It is
perhaps in this sense, that the present has been shaped by the past and can only
fully be understood through knowledge of that past. That "Holmes" rather
cryptic statement should be interpreted: "The present has a right to govern
83 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, supra note 77 at 24, 163 N.E.2d at
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itself, so far as it can. . . . Historical continuity with the past is not a duty,
it is only a necessity. . ...,
With this in mind, an examination of this immunity provision is called for
to see if a change is in order.
THE PRESENT PROVISION MISSTATES THE FACTS
At the outset, it must be recognized that article IV, section 26 mis-
represents the facts. As is seen from the foregoing exposition of the
current position of sovereign immunity in Illinois, the state can be made
a defendant and is subjected to the same principals of law and equity
as are private individuals. While the forum is administrative and recovery
limited, liability remains the same. We have seen how the immunity of
certain state agencies has been whittled away under the justification that
they are no longer considered state agencies. Needless to say, the consti-
tution should not be a fraud. It should reflect what the law really is in
order that the layman, by a simple reading, car understand, at least in a
general way, the nature and extent of his rights. To be sure, a well versed
attorney, in such cases, should and would turn to the court of claims to
seek a remedy, but the state constitution is not only for lawyers; it is for
the people. This is perhaps the most compelling reason for change, al-
though little mention is made of it by the commentators.
THE RESTRICTIVE EFFECTS OF THE PRESENT PROVISION
The main reason for amending this provision lies in the restrictive ef-
fects upon the legislature imposed by the constitutional doctrine of sep-
aration of powers. Because of this provision, the court of claims, or any
other tribunal the legislature may deem to establish in the future, must be,
of necessity, an administrative agency of the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment. This means, in essence, that the legislature, even if it chose to do
so, could not permit, for example, judicial review of the court of claims or
submission of certain claims to the judicial courts. This is the reason that
the recent court decisions and statutes are prefaced with the dicta that the
agency found to be amenable to suit is not a state agency.
The Illinois constitution of 1870, which provides that the state shall never be
made a defendant in any court of law or equity, has to some extent limited
the manner in which claims against the state can be settled. Unless this pro-
vision of the constitution were amended, and there is currently no movement
for such an amendment, it would be impossible for the legislature to enact
consent statutes for suit in the regular courts, or to establish a judicial tribunal
in the regular judiciary to handle such claims.2
1 Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation,
31 U.CHi. L. REV. 502, 530 (1964).
2 SPIEGEL, THE ILLINOIS COURT OF CLAIMS: A STUDY OF STATE LIABILITY 206 (1962).
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The effect of the constitutional provision is best exemplified by the fol-
lowing hypothetical. If the courts of Illinois were to hold that part of the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
was de facto an unconstitutional consent by the state to allow certain state
agencies to be amenable to suit in the judicial courts, such a determination
could be a defeat to a valid legislative policy under the present provision,
article IV, section 26. The chances of such occurring are indeed doubtful,
but the fact that it could is a vivid example of the problems presented by
retaining this provision in its present form. This provision acts as a shackle
upon the legislature. As a practical matter, it could prevent the legislature
from creating the court of claims as a part of the judicial branch of the
government. Thus, the court of claims would not be subject of the review
procedures of the judiciary system, or to that system's supervisory powers.
The only appeal from the court of claims is to that court itself. This is
perhaps the very reason for the court's inconsistent behavior in the past
when awards were granted "in equity and good conscience," rather than
upon rights given to the litigants under the law. Had the stabilizing effects
of judicial review been available, in all likelihood this never would have
happened. Arbitrary law making, although not a problem today, is never-
theless a danger, and it may come forward in the future to haunt both the
state and litigants alike.
Furthermore, the temptation of political influence present in adminis-
trative agencies should not be introduced into judicial proceedings. The
all important principal of the independent judiciary cannot be applied by
the legislature to the court of claims. For example, in the court of claims,
the claim of each plaintiff is submitted to a commissioner who hears the
parties' witnesses and evidence and makes a record of the case which is
submitted to the judges for decision. These commissioners have frequently
been political appointees rather than individuals with judicial experience. 4
Being unable to place the court of claims under the authority of the judi-
cial department, independent supervision by the judiciary appears impos-
sible.
These restrictive effects upon the legislature are again consequences that
go unnoticed by the commentators, probably because the only visible ef-
fect of the provision is to protect the state from liability, and thus appar-
ently release the legislature from the fear of law suits. Yet, these restric-
3 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, S 1-206 (1965). Section 1-206 states that "local public entity"
includes a county, township, municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school
board, forest preserve district, park district, fire protection district, sanitary district,
and all other local governmental bodies. It does not include the state or any office,
officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission, university or similar agency
of the state.
4 SPIEGEL, Op. cit. supra note 2 at 168.
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tions are present and should be dealt with accordingly. The majority of
writers are of the opinion that a state's degree of amenability to suit should
be a matter of legislative decision, and perhaps this is a valid observation,
since the legislature, rather than the courts, has the facilities for such
policy-making.5 While the question of what the legislature's policy should
be is not within the scope of this work, it should be recognized that such
policy-making is seriously hampered by this provision. The legislature has
basically three general policy choices: no liability, liability in an adminis-
trative agency, or liability in the judicial system. Since the legislature can-
not establish a policy of amenability to suit in the judicial courts, article
IV, section 26 takes from the legislature one of its three major policy
choices.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A REVISION
The next point, of course, is whether the legislature should be given this
policy-making power, and what consequences would follow. Perhaps this
is a moot question in Illinois, since the results of the present administrative
system are clearly visible. Needless to say, were the legislature to confer
jurisdiction upon the judiciary to hear claims against the state, liability
would be limited as a matter of policy, probably under a statute similar to
the present Local Government and Governmental Employees Tort Im-
munity Act. If, for the sake of argument, however, the legislature were to
make the state completely liable, in the judicial courts, for all tortious con-
duct committed by its servants, no matter what the function in which
they were engaged, the consequences would be great.
First, the state would be subject to the same law as any other defend-
ant. It would not be an insurer of all claims, since liability would have to
be proven whether the case involved a ministerial or discretionary func-
tion. The mere fact that a decision of some official is discretionary does
not mean that the state would be liable if the official, in good faith, errs.
This point is not considered by those who fear that government liability
would open the flood-gates to frivolous claims, virtually rendering the
state one vast insurance company. A similar fear, often expressed, is that
to submit the claims of private persons against the state to a jury would
automatically render the state liable due to the sympathy of the jury in
favor of a private litigant against a large, fluid and impersonal state gov-
5 See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925);
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1039 (1927). See also,
2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 29.3 (1956); Green, Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 ILL.
L. REV. 355 (1944); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporation, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28
(1921); Repko, American Legal Commentary of the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Lia-
bility, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 214 (1942); Note, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 914 (1953); Note,
54 Nw. U. L. REV. 588 (1959).
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ernment. This view evidences a gross -lack of faith in our judicial system.
Certainly, if the state employs competent counsel and conscientiously de-
fends these claims, the state will have the same rights as any other party
before the court.
Secondly, the courts would probably apply to any such case against the
state the ease law developed over the years in dealing with other public
entities, such as municipal corporations. Thus, the governmental-proprie-
tary distinction doctrine, non-feasance doctrine, and the law-making doc-
trine would limit state liability as a matter of judicial policy.
In considering the economics of liability, any discussion must be pref-
aced by recognizing that the state is, in effect, a business, and like any
business, it should suffer the normal risks of operation. Liability for the
misfeasance of servants and agents is a normal risk, but a well-run business
can prepare and protect itself.
Since the inception of the Court of Claims in 1889, through 1960, 4,621
claims were considered, 6.1 per cent of these being filed since 1933. Of
these, awards were granted in 53.7 per cent of the cases. 6 Total awards
made from 1889 to 1960 amounted to $5,619,314, with the single highest
award being $102,805.26. 7 On the average, most awards have been for
amounts between $1,000 and $5,000.8 Fifty-three per cent of the total
claims (2449) have been tort claims. Awards were made in 59.3 per cent
of the tort claims filed, but since 1945, awards have been made in 66.4 per
cent of the cases. A total of 188 awards have been made in personal injury
cases, but this represents only 34.4 per cent of the tort claims filed. 9
In comparison, the city of Chicago, being a municipal corporation and
liable in tort, had 1281 tort claims filed against it in 1965 alone, represent-
ing a total ad damnurn of $39,699,844.44. A total of $1,670,060.14 was paid
out by the city, $1300 in jury verdicts, and $1,668,760 by settlement. A
survey of the number of cases, disposal of cases, and funds paid out in set-
tlement over the past five years, indicates a comparative consistency from
year to year.")
The Chicago Transit Authority, a public corporation, provides com-
muter and rapid transit service for metropolitan Chicago. Needless to say,
the operation of such a system involves a particularly high risk in tort lia-
bility. The Authority classifies tort liability as an operation and mainte-
6 SPEIGEL, op. cit. supra note 2 at 193. 8 Id. at 196.
7 Id. at 195. 9 Id. at 197.
10 From a statistical summary furnished by Mr. Brian M. Kilgallon, head of the Torts
Division of the City of Chicago Law Department, to be published in the ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE LAW DEPARTMENT, 1965. Total judgments for 1960 were $1,357,217; for
1961,.$1,132,957; for 1962, $1,345,243; for 1963, $1,639,211; for 1964, $2,294,390; and for
1965, $1,670,060.
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nance expense. In 1964, the Authority suffered a total of 21,413 claims.
The average settlement for each was $165. Of these, 2,443 were disposed
of by lawsuit, with each case going to court costing an average of $1,913
per settlement, plus an additional overhead expense of $499. In 1964 the
claims department budget, including claims, suit settlements and expenses,
was $7,249,111. Hence, claims cost the Authority 5.40 per cent of its total
revenues.
11
These figures indicate that governmental entities as large or larger than
many state agencies can, and do, suffer tort liability, and do prepare suffi-
ciently for it, so that normal operations are not affected. The authority
prepares for liability by use of a sinking fund, but liability insurance,
graduated tax levies, and deferred payment plans are also alternatives. It is
interesting to note that the State of Illinois settled the judgments arising
from the Molitor decision 12 by an appropriation of $750,000 from the State
Motor Fuel Tax Fund to Kane County. 8 Perhaps this is a suitable alterna-
tive for state liability protection arising out of the use of the highways.
In any event, the-conclusion is.inescapable that the state, from a finan-
cial point of view, can- sustain liability if the legislature chooses to make it
liable through a revision of article IV, section -26. With a minimum of
proper administration, none of the state's vital functions should be inter-
rupted.
Needless to say, despite the previous supposition, it is almost certain that
the Illinois legislature would not make such a universal grant of jurisdic-
tion to the state courts. Davis points out that such a universal delegation by
the legislature to the courts would be a mere "passing of the buck" and
that the courts would eventually set guidelines within the areas of liability
wherein the state should be immune as a matter of public policy. 14
PROPOSALS
Any proposal should grant to the legislature the authority to make the
desired policy decisions and yet not upset the present administrative sys-
tem which has worked so well over the years. It is no more desirable to
remove the legislature's power to choose to retain the administrative sys-
tem than to prevent the legislature from rendering the state amenable to
11CHIcAGo TRANSIT AUTHORITY ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1964).
12 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
13 DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 87TH ANNUAL REPORT 59 (1965).
The Motor Fuel Tax Fund derives proceeds from the Illinois gasoline tax. Part of the
proceeds are allocated to the State Road Fund for maintenance of the highways,
while another portion is.deposited in the Motor Fuel Tax Distributive Fund for dis-
bursement upon approval by the: Division of Highways, to counties, municipalities and
townships..
.
14 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 25.17 (1959).
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suits in the judicial courts. Furthermore, merely to strike out the present
provision without substituting an amendment would create more disorder
than doing nothing at all. The conflict now existing between the legisla-
ture and the judiciary would become impossible to resolve. The whole
question might well deteriorate into a situation similar to that which arose
after the Molitor decision, when the courts rendered decisions, and the
legislature enacted haphazard statutes to neutralize the effects. Even though
the present provision is not desirable, it does at least maintain a degree of
order by withholding jurisdiction from the judiciary under all circum-
stances.
The problem, then, is to find language which would best achieve the
desired result. The language of the state constitutions with provisions dif-
ferent from that of Illinois can be classified into four categories. The first
provides that suits may be brought as directed by law, but does not specif-
ically designate what branch of the government must do the directing. 15
While the implication is clear that the legislature is the branch of the gov-
ernment contemplated by the framers, a constitution should be clear in its
delegation of powers to avoid any possible conflict between the branches.
As little as possible should be left to implication.
The second type provides, in mandatory language, that the legislature
has the duty to direct where and how suits shall be brought. 16 The draw-
back to this language is that it does not retain for the legislature the requi-
site amount of discretion for making policy decisions. The language speci-
fies "suit" rather than "claim." This could be interpreted in light of the
mandatory language as requiring the legislature to render the state liable
in the judicial courts despite a policy in favor of administrative adjust-
ment.
The third type of provision generally specifies a rather elaborate pro-
cedure for the settlement of claims and is found most often under the dele-
gation of revenue powers. 17 Such provisions are no better than statutes
15 See, e.g., CALIF. CONST. art. XX, § 6: "Suits may be brought against the state in such
manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law." See also, CONN. CoNsT. art. III,
7; DEL. CONST. art. I, 9; FLA. CONST. art. III, 22; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; ORF. CoNsrT.
art. IV, § 24.
16 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 21: "The legislature shall establish procedures for
suits against the state." See also, ARiz. CONsT. art. IV, pt. 2, § 18; MIcH. CONST. art. IV,
S 22; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 22; WASH. CONST. art. II, S 26; Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 27.
17 See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 18: "The governor, secretary of state, attorney-
general shall constitute a board of examiners, with power to examine all claims against
the state, except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, and perform such
other duties as may be prescribed by law: provided, that in the administration of
moneys in cooperation with the federal government the legislature may prescribe any
method of disbursement required to obtain the benefits of federal law. And no claims
against the state, except salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be
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which authorize claims courts, adjustment boards, and similar administra-
tive tribunals. An adjustment in policy must be made by the cumbersome
procedure of repeal, and such naturally tends to unnecessarily stagnate
reform, should the need arise.
The fourth provision, the one best suited to satisfy the present needs of
Illinois, gives the legislature the power, and complete discretion, to decide
in what manner suits should be brought.18 The provision designates the
branch of the government to have the power and specifies that the power
is discretionary, which necessarily means that an administrative tribunal
is a permissible alternative to liability in the judicial courts. As applied to
Illinois, this would mean the legislature could enact consent statutes or
that it could place the court of claims under the supervision of the judi-
ciary. At the same time, the legislature would have authority to retain the
court of claims as an independent administrative agency if it chose to do
so. Ultimately then, the discretion in deciding public policy concerning
the question of sovereign immunity would be with the legislature.
In conclusion, it is imperative to remember that it is a constitution which
is now sought to be amended. Although the present state of the law may
be favorable to the state's creditors and in the true sense just, this does not
mean that improvement at this time is not inappropriate considering the
fact that any new constitution may need to endure for another ninety-six
years. To paraphrase Justice Marshall, a "provision is made in a consti-
tution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs."' 9
Human affairs in the twentieth century proceed at a rapid pace calling
for immediate legislative and judicial counteraction. Thus, the people
should vest in the legislature the power to facilitate just and equitable set-
tlement of claims against the state as the legislature finds appropriate, even
if their selection is for adjudication in the judicial system.
John Peterson
passed upon by the legislature without first having been considered and acted upon by
said board." See also, Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 22; MONT. Co:asT. art. VII, § 20; N.C. CoNST.
art. IV, § 9; N.Y. CoNsr. art. III, S 19.
18 See, e.g., Ky. CONST. S 231: "The General Assembly may, by law, direct in what
manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the Commonwealth." See also,
N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 22; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 11; S.C. CoNs'r. art. XVII, § 2; Wyo. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
19 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, (1819).
